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53 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: 
Comment on Feldman 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff  
In 1975, the Ford Motor Corporation issued an internal memo 
explaining that the $11 gas cap filter it could install on its Pinto 
model cars would cost more than Ford would likely have to pay in 
damages for potential human injury and loss of life stemming from 
the lack of the filter. Ford estimated the total cost for all affected 
vehicles at $137.5 million; the cost in terms of injury and death was 
only $49.53 million.
1
 In purely economic terms, then, defining the 
cost of injury and death as quantified by the National Highway Safety 
Commission, Ford made the correct decision. Nowhere did Ford‘s 
memo consider the non-monetary value of human life weighed 
against the cost of a relatively simple and inexpensive ―fix‖ to the 
Pinto. This well-known story still stands as a noteworthy example of 
corporate behavior motivated by profit maximization rather than 
moral concerns about customer safety.  
In the terms used by modern theorists, it seems that Ford‘s 
position, which reduced the value of human life to less than $11 per 
vehicle, represents an example of ―crowding out,‖ where an extrinsic 
motivation undermines an intrinsic one.
2
 The likely penalties of the 
American tort system acted as an extrinsic motivation that effectively 
―crowded out‖ Ford‘s intrinsic motivation to protect its customers 
from harm.
3
 In his essay for this symposium volume, Yuval Feldman 
 
 
 Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. Thanks to Susan 
Appleton, Matt Bodie, Elizabeth Chen, and Laura Rosenbury for comments and suggestions.  
 1. Memorandum from E.S. Grush & C.S. Saunby, Fatalities Associated with Crash 
Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires 6, available at http://www.autosafety.org/uploads/phpq3mJ7F_ 
FordMemo.pdf. 
 2. Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance 
Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 11 (2011). 
 3. I suggest here for rhetorical ease that Ford‘s management did have some intrinsic 
motivations that were crowded out. Of course, this might not be true, which would present a 
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tackles the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, 
explaining that extrinsic motivation has the potential to act in concert 
with intrinsic motivation or to undermine intrinsic motivation.
4
 
Although research on the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation has not yet fully identified the necessary conditions that 
elicit ―crowding out‖ or acting supportively, Feldman offers several 
insights and suggestions about how the law might respond to the 
problems posed by these multiple motivations.  
This Comment proceeds in three parts. I first expand on 
Feldman‘s briefly noted concerns about the nature of the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The intrinsic/extrinsic 
dichotomy, while stylistically appealing, may needlessly complicate 
questions of motivation in the legal context. This divide is not of 
Feldman‘s making, to be sure, and serves an important and useful 
role in decades of social science research. However, the distinction 
has grown ever less stark and more complex over time, and I posit 
here that separating intrinsic from extrinsic motivation, per se, may 
not be the most fruitful path for legal scholars interested in what 
motivates individuals to comply with law. Second, I consider more 
fully the implications of the crowding out literature that Feldman 
discusses, suggesting that tort law, especially as it applies to 
corporate actors who have knowledge about potential harm to others, 
is an arena likely to engender crowding out. I argue here that in 
certain legal contexts where society truly wants to deter certain 
behavior, higher penalties may simply make concern over crowding 
out moot. Third, I go beyond Feldman‘s analysis of intrinsic and 
extrinsic compliance motivations to consider his paradigm in a 
different setting. Specifically, I suggest that a consideration of the 
motivation of actors in our legal system is incomplete when we focus 
only on the potential tortfeasor, contract breacher, or other actor 
considering whether or not to comply with the law. I briefly explore 
the issue of motivation from the perspective of the person seeking 
recovery from harm, suggesting ways in which different motivations 
could affect potential litigants.  
 
different case. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 4. See generally Feldman, supra note 2.  
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THE LINE BETWEEN INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
It is difficult, as Feldman briefly notes, to adequately demarcate 
the line between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
5
 As a preliminary 
matter, it is hard even to define intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in a 
fully satisfying way.
6
 In their ―pure‖ form, one comes completely 
from outside the individual, and one comes solely from within. For a 
theoretical example of pure extrinsic motivation, one might consider 
an individual who would not engage in some behavior that she 
otherwise believes to be the right thing to do only because of the 
negative consequences that are likely to ensue, or who would engage 
in some behavior that she otherwise believes wrong because it will 
bring about positive consequences for her.
7
 For an example of pure 
intrinsic motivation, imagine an individual doing what she believes is 
right in the face of negative consequences, or refusing to do what she 
thinks is wrong despite the positive consequences.
8
  
Even these extreme examples are subject to a greater criticism: 
that the definitions of extrinsic and intrinsic are themselves flawed. 
Take, for example, law and economics scholar Robert Cooter‘s 
perspective on moral commitments, which are often considered the 
essence of intrinsic commitments. Cooter‘s theory postulates that 
―people will tend to make moral commitments when doing so causes 
a sufficiently large increase in their opportunities.‖9 That is to say, 
according to Cooter, people only have so-called intrinsic moral 
beliefs when extrinsic factors motivate them to do so. On the other 
end of the spectrum, one might suggest that extrinsic motivations, 
such as fear of punishment or promise of reward, only have meaning 
when someone already has an intrinsic propensity to care about his or 
her liberty or financial gain or loss. Without an intrinsic sense of the 
 
 5. Id. at 18–19.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Imagine a person who fails to correct a bank error in her favor in order to avoid the 
bank taking back the money, or a person who wrongly turns in another person for a crime that 
person did not commit merely to collect reward money.  
 8. Imagine a political dissident who speaks out against the government while knowing it 
will result in harsh punishment, or a manager refusing to take a corporate bribe even when it is 
certain to go undetected.  
 9. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000).  
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worth of these extrinsic factors, they are meaningless. These 
arguments suggest a grave difficulty with trying to parse individuals‘ 
motivations along simple extrinsic/intrinsic dimensions. 
Even if one accepts the existence of a true and knowable divide 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, several other problems 
present themselves. Less fundamentally fatal to the distinction, but 
more pragmatically problematic, most behavior—both action and 
inaction—does not appear to fit squarely in one of the extreme 
examples discussed above. Situations rarely present themselves in 
such an obvious and dichotomous manner, and in the vast middle 
area, these motivations are likely to twine together, perhaps 
inextricably. Multiple motivations are certainly capable of coexisting 
in the same individual. Many people, for example, find aspects of 
their jobs personally satisfying: the motivation to perform certain 
tasks because one finds them gratifying can easily exist 
simultaneously with individuals‘ motivations to earn money though 
work.  
Additionally, as Feldman notes, quite rightly, there are more than 
two simple types of motivation, and many types of motivation ―could 
not be easily defined as either extrinsic or intrinsic.‖10 Any particular 
motivation one might identify may be subject to multiple 
interpretations along extrinsic/intrinsic lines. Feldman briefly 
mentions fairness motivations, suggesting that although they have 
traditionally been understood as intrinsic, a more nuanced view 
would suggest that fairness has both intrinsic and extrinsic 
components.
11
 Although a large body of research in social 
psychology has supported the importance that the fairness of process 
(procedural justice) plays in individuals‘ formations of judgments 
about decisions that affect them, theorists disagree about the reasons 
for this effect. Under the original instrumental theory proposed by 
Thibaut and Walker, effect on monetary outcome explained concerns 
about fair process.
12
 People wanted a fair outcome and they felt that a 
 
 10. Feldman, supra note 2, at 18. 
 11. Id. at 19. 
 12. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 94 (1975). 
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fair process would achieve it.
13
 More recently, Van den Bos and 
others have suggested that fair process matters to individuals because 
it serves as a proxy by which people judge their outcomes.
14
 This 
focus on outcomes sounds, on its face, like an extrinsic motivation: 
people are motivated by a desire to receive the right amount of 
money.  
Yet even this outcome focus is perhaps less purely instrumental 
than it appears at first glance. Why is a fair outcome important to 
anyone? On one hand, perhaps self-serving biases dictate that 
individuals will believe that only a positive outcome for them is a fair 
outcome for them—that is, no bad outcome could possibly be fair. 
And it is certainly true that individuals do define fairness differently 
depending on their position relative to others.
15
 But taking the idea 
that people want a fair outcome seriously suggests that people have 
some motivation to receive not merely a positive outcome but one 
that comports with some fairness norm, which suggests in turn a need 
for fair treatment that does not fit squarely within the traditional 
extrinsic motivation paradigm.  
Even assuming that people do care about procedural justice 
because of extrinsic motivation, other theorists have suggested that 
instrumental reasons incompletely account for why people care about 
fairness of treatment. Tom Tyler and Allan Lind argue that 
procedural justice also matters to individuals because their treatment 
by others reflects their status within society and that this status 
information is a key component in people‘s sense of self-worth and 
self-esteem.
16
 Indeed, they suggest that this status information is 
more influential than concern about outcome.
17
 Self-worth and self-
 
 13. Id.  
 14. Kees van den Bos, E. Allan Lind, Riёl Vermunt & Henk A.M. Wilke, How Do I Judge 
My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process 
Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1044 (1997).  
 15. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and 
Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 86, 106 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).  
 16. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 162–66 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, The 
Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 837 (1989). 
 17. Tyler & Lind, supra note 16, at 165.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:53 
 
 
esteem certainly appear to be factors that are more intrinsic than 
extrinsic, although one could debate that point as well. Because 
research has supported both instrumental and relational reasons for 
caring about procedural justice, it seems impossible to cleanly 
categorize procedural justice motivation in either the intrinsic or the 
extrinsic camp. 
One might perform a similar analysis for any number of 
motivations noted by Feldman.
18
 Indeed, Feldman‘s own suggestion 
that the love or money divide echoes the intrinsic/extrinsic categories 
further highlights the problematic nature of the categories. Feldman 
calls love ―one of the most basic intrinsic motivations,‖19 and, indeed, 
social psychologists have suggested that the human need for social 
connection is fundamental.
20
 Yet what is love if not extrinsically 
oriented? Love for another person provides not just intrinsic 
motivation but a very clearly defined external individual towards 
whom one directs action and affective behavior. Indeed, individuals 
often define love almost entirely in light of the object of that love: 
parent/child, romantic, familial, or friendship love are conceptualized 
differently and in terms of that love‘s recipient. And one of the 
hallmarks of love—caring deeply about satisfying the needs and 
desires of another party—sounds quite extrinsic.    
A deeper question lurks behind these efforts to describe various 
motivations—trust, altruism, fairness, morality, enrichment—as 
intrinsic or extrinsic. Individuals have different orientations towards 
all of these motivations. Yet where do these orientations—or 
preferences—themselves come from? Psychologists have long 
suggested that all behavior is a function of the interplay between the 
self and society,
21
 another echo of the distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation; economists have only begun to seek 
 
 18. Feldman, supra note 2, at 16.  
 19. Id. at 12. 
 20. See Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for 
Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 
522 (1995). 
 21. Kurt Lewin developed the so-called ―Lewinian equation,‖ B=f(PE), which suggested 
that behavior is a function of the person and the environment. Edward E. Jones, Major 
Developments in Five Decades of Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 3, 35 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
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answers to the question of the origins of preferences.
22
 This is 
perhaps simply yet another version of the age-old nature versus 
nurture debate. Do our preferences come from within us, or are they 
shaped by our environment, or both? Attempts to neatly cleave the 
extrinsic from the intrinsic are necessarily suspect when considered 
through this broad lens. In sum, Feldman implies, and I argue further, 
that the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic—or, potentially, 
love and money—is a false dichotomy. The intrinsic and the extrinsic 
cannot be fully teased out from one another in any meaningful way in 
complex human behavior, or, often, even understood as distinct 
theoretical constructs. 
Nonetheless, there is still room for consideration of how different 
motivations affect individuals and situations differently. Moral values 
and monetary fines, love and rewards, trust and punishment, fairness 
and deposits—these may still have differential effects on behavior. I 
merely suggest here that a primary focus on defining and explaining 
the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation may create 
an overly complex and unworkable paradigm. Considering multiple 
motivations and their effect on behavior makes more sense and will 
be richer and more reflective of reality when it avoids an unneeded 
focus on the origins of the motivation.  
HOW CROWDING OUT UNDERMINES MORALITY 
Crowding out appears as a disturbing phenomenon when it has the 
effect of either discouraging behavior that society wants to encourage 
or promoting behavior that society wishes to prohibit. That is, when a 
reward for behavior leads to a decrease in the behavior, or when a 
fine or penalty for a behavior leads to an increase in the behavior, 
crowding out represents a problem. Although social science research 
on crowding out has largely focused on the effect of rewards, rather 
than sanctions,
23
 and although there are ways in which the law 
provides incentive structures for certain behaviors,
24
 crowding-out 
 
 22. Cooter, supra note 9, at 18.  
 23. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic 
Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 40 (1980). 
 24. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:53 
 
 
effects have also been found with penalties, and far more of our legal 
system is based on the idea that we prohibit certain actions and 
support that prohibition with the threat of negative consequences. 
That is, most law contains negative consequences for breaking it, 
rather than positive consequences for compliance: the positive 
consequences for compliance are usually the absence of negative 
consequences.  
Feldman, while noting both possibilities, appears more interested 
in incentives; in this section, I take a closer look at crowding out in 
the context of penalties. I suggest, first, that crowding out may 
accurately capture a very real threat to individuals‘ motivation to 
comport with the law. Second, I argue that, in the settings where we 
ought most to worry about crowding out, this threat may easily be 
mitigated simply by increasing fines, prices, or penalties.  
In one of the most notable examples of research on crowding out 
due to penalties, Gneezy and Rustichini found that—in contrast to 
their expectations—imposing fines for late pickup at a child day care 
center increased rather than decreased late pickup.
25
 Economic theory 
suggested that increasing the price of a behavior would reduce the 
incidence of the behavior, but instead, the study suggested that some 
parents apparently felt that the fine was a price for late pickup that 
they were willing to pay.
26
 Gneezy and Rustichini offered two 
explanations for the adherence to the rule prior to the imposition of 
the fine: lack of information about what might happen if parents are 
late, or a refusal to violate social norms regarding ―a generous, 
nonmarket activity.‖27 However, another way to look at the pre-fine 
behavior is that some parents were deterred merely by their 
unwillingness to inconvenience others or to feel bad about 
themselves for breaking rules. With the fine, this moral or social 
motivation
28
 was no longer at work for some of them: in essence, the 
fine meant that parents could replace feeling bad about 
inconveniencing others with a simple monetary transaction.
29
 This 
 
L. REV. 1151 (2010).  
 25. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2000).  
 26. See id. at 14. 
 27. See id. at 13.  
 28. Under the framework discussed by Feldman, this would be an intrinsic motivation.  
 29. See, e.g., Brian Sheppard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/4
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result is surprising to economists
30
 because the idea of intrinsic 
motivation as a deterrent has not been popular as an economic 
model.
31
 And yet raising monetary or other purely quantifiable costs
32
 
is not the only way to raise the costs of behavior—witness the 
theoretical debate over shaming in the criminal law context. The idea 
that we could increase embarrassment and shame as a punishment 
rather than increasing prison time or fines suggests that intrinsic 
motivation has already been put to use in the law.
33
 
Returning to the example in my introduction, why did the tort 
system‘s monetary damages apparently crowd out any potential 
moral imperative Ford might have felt with respect to its faulty gas-
cap placement? Our tort system nicely comports with the factors that 
Feldman suggests must be in place in order to make certain penalties 
feel merely like prices for engaging in certain behavior. As Feldman 
explains, his research with Teichman identified three factors that 
make payments seem like prices: first, that a payment is more certain 
than uncertain; second, that payment is made up-front; and third, that 
a harmed individual rather than a third party gets the money.
34
 All of 
these suggest that tort law, especially as it applies to sophisticated 
corporate actors,
35
 may be more likely to undermine than support 
 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable Behavior, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 55, 64 (2010) (―[P]arents acted as if the fine were nothing more than the low 
price for showing up late.‖). 
 30. Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi & Georg von Wangenheim, Legal Innovation 
and the Compliance Paradox, MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 837, 838 (2008) (asserting that Gneezy 
and Rustichini‘s results were ―surprisingly different‖ from typical cost-benefit analysis).  
 31. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A 
Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 638–40 (2010) (noting that economic 
predictions about contract behavior ignore moral elements related to making and keeping 
promises).  
 32. Increasing prison time for convicted criminals is an example of non-monetary but 
quantifiable costs. But see sources cited infra note 40 (debate between Markel & Flanders and 
Bronsteen et al.).  
 33. See, e.g., Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the 
Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 187–88 (2005) 
(describing shaming punishments such as drunk drivers advertising misdeeds on bumper 
stickers, thieves with sandwich boards about their transgressions, and public television 
appearances by prostitute solicitors).  
 34. Feldman, supra note 2, at 27–29.  
 35. Although individuals driving down the street are unlikely to perform an expected 
value calculation when they fiddle with their radio rather than alertly scanning oncoming 
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intrinsic motivation. First, the expected value calculation that is 
currently at the heart of tort law creates a number that represents 
likelihood times payment—the whole point is to remove the 
uncertainty factor from the calculation. That is, expected value 
calculation is designed to represent a real number that already 
incorporates likelihood rather than an abstract damages number with 
some corresponding probability of liability. Similarly, expected value 
calculation can make it seem as though the money is set aside up-
front: by calculating the costs and benefits, one has already implicitly 
mentally ―set aside‖ that sum for payment to individuals who are 
harmed. Finally, tort law provides harmed individuals with direct 
recovery. What the day care study suggests for tort law is that 
penalties may have the potential, when set at a low enough level,
36
 to 
replace, for some people, the potential ―intrinsic‖ deterrent effect of 
feeling bad about harming others (or violating social norms) with a 
―price for doing business‖ attitude.37  
Feldman suggests that perhaps law may function differently than 
monetary penalties, and that there may be potential to positively 
exploit the difference between penalties and law because money may 
undermine intrinsic motivation, but law might enhance it.
38
 Feldman 
implicitly suggests that the symbolic additive feature of ―the law‖ 
weighing in, with the moral judgment that law carries, may provide 
protection against crowding out. This point is an important one, and 
merits further development and research. Law, as a philosophical 
matter, self-consciously intends to serve both an expressive and 
deterrent function—that is, both to tell individuals what behavior is 
morally right and wrong, and to set penalties for choosing the 
morally wrong actions. However, civil law about recovery for harm 
is, in practice, almost completely about the allocation of money. 
Certainly, the Ford Pinto example, along with other high-profile torts 
cases and examples from law and economics scholarship, suggests 
that many people view the tort system as simply a set of monetary 
 
traffic, corporate actors and their attorneys are more likely to be familiar with the expected 
value calculation paradigm, especially as they develop or market new products or services. 
 36. As Gneezy and Rustichini note, ―It is true that a ‗large enough‘ fee would eventually 
reduce the behavior.‖ Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 25, at 15.  
 37. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1531 (1984). 
 38. See Feldman, supra note 2, at 43–44.  
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penalties rather than a reflection of a moral imperative for behavior.
39
 
The day care study suggests that perhaps setting the penalty too low 
makes the rule fail on an expressive level, because the low magnitude 
of the penalty itself embodies the moral judgment about the 
behavior—that is to say, not that immoral at all. However, this 
assessment would change if the penalty were set high enough to 
suggest a societal judgment about morality: just as the criminal law 
calibrates punishment to reflect society‘s level of disapprobation of 
certain behavior,
40
 civil monetary penalties might be set so high that 
they signal a negative moral judgment about behavior.  
For this reason, law ought to be careful to pitch penalties at the 
right—high—level41 when dealing with behavior that it always wants 
to deter, such as intentional tort or gross negligence.
42
 When the level 
of penalty is high enough, we receive multiple benefits. First, we may 
achieve some expressive value, as noted above. Second, though, we 
can be sure that we deter the behavior: those with no intrinsic 
motivation will only be affected by the penalty because, as Feldman 
suggests, we need not worry about undermining intrinsic motivation 
if people are not already intrinsically motivated. And those with some 
intrinsic motivation may find such motivation crowded out by the 
penalties—but if the penalty is high enough, they will still refrain 
from the behavior in order to avoid the penalty, even if they ignore 
the expressive function. Although society might benefit when people 
 
 39. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 
2314–15 (2010). 
 40. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, 
Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2010); Dan Markel & 
Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts? The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2010). 
 41. In essence, this is the flip side of the argument that Gneezy and Rustichini make in a 
different paper about the effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation: they suggest that the reward 
ought to be high enough, or one shouldn‘t offer it at all. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay 
Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791 (2000).  
 42. Similarly, a system of strict liability for products that society wants corporations to 
take extra care in constructing also increases penalties. In a context like breach of contract, the 
law may pitch damages lower on purpose—that is, both not to deter everyone (so as to 
encourage so-called efficient breach) and to signal that the breaching of a contract does not 
represent a significant moral harm. For an interesting discussion of crowding out in the 
contracts setting, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The 
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).  
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abstain from action on moral rather than economic grounds, if the 
law‘s main point is to prevent certain behavior, the underlying 
motivations may be irrelevant and raising penalties will be effective. 
Deterrence and expressive functions of the law work in sync here, 
because it is only when we really believe something is sufficiently 
bad that we will raise penalties to the level where they send this 
expressive message, and at that high level, they will also have a 
deterrent effect. 
Both the findings of the day care study and others by Feldman 
seem to suggest the existence of different populations of individuals 
with respect to their potential to be affected by crowding out.
43
 Some 
individuals appear mostly intrinsically motivated (say, parents who 
never picked up late under either regime), some may be mostly 
extrinsically motivated (say, any parents who stopped picking up late 
after the imposition of the fine), some have an unclear motivation 
(those who were already picking up late, even before the fine), and 
finally some have an intrinsic motivation that is crowded out by 
extrinsic motivation (the group who only picked up late after the 
imposition of the fine). In his essay, Feldman suggests that perhaps 
we need not worry much about the intrinsically motivated: they, after 
all, are less sensitive to variation in the framing of extrinsic 
motivation.
44
 If this proposition is the case, then perhaps crowding 
out is not all that pervasive a phenomenon. Additionally, this 
statement raises a question: certainly those who lack any intrinsic 
motivation aren‘t likely to behave better than those who have some 
such intrinsic motivation, are they? That is, even if extrinsic 
motivation undermines the intrinsically motivated person, it seems 
unlikely to make them any worse than the person who never 
possessed intrinsic motivation. So crowding out is likely merely to 
put that first person in the same position as the purely extrinsically 
motivated person. In either case, the law‘s primary focus ought to be 
on setting the level of deterrence high enough to prevent the action.  
 
 43. Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An 
Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic Enforcement, 
36 J.L. & SOC‘Y 501 (2009).  
 44. Feldman, supra note 2, at 41. 
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On the other hand, if people are differentially affected, it may be 
that an added extrinsic penalty or fine will promote behavior in some 
people but will prevent it in others. For example, in the day care 
study, it might be that some group of people with no intrinsic 
motivation to pick up their children on time are actually deterred by 
the fine, but for others, the fine acts as a price that also crowds out 
their intrinsic motivation. If so, then the main question becomes 
focused on what percentage of the population is affected in which 
way so that one can implement a system whose net effect would be to 
decrease the undesirable activity. However, because the law cannot 
tailor itself to different populations in this way, a better focus remains 
calibrating the penalty high enough to deter both groups.  
THE ROLE OF INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION IN LITIGANTS 
Our civil legal system is largely designed around the idea of 
monetary compensation for harm. When a potential plaintiff decides 
whether or not to bring a lawsuit, contemporary economic analysis 
suggests that she will weigh the expected value of the potential 
recovery against the expected costs of litigation. This paradigm 
perfectly captures the extrinsically motivated individual. However, 
research in psychology and law has suggested a host of other, non-
monetary factors that have an impact on how individuals perceive the 
resolution of their disputes.  
The need for justice and moral satisfaction—a classic ―intrinsic‖ 
motivation—also drives individuals in their determinations about 
whether to sue someone, what recovery will satisfy them, and how 
acceptable they will find the resolution of a dispute. For example, 
research in psychology and law has suggested that individuals are 
most satisfied by legal processes not when they win but when they 
are treated fairly.
45
 Additionally, research has suggested that litigants, 
more so than attorneys, are particularly interested in—and value 
highly—receiving apologies.46 So, too, scholars have suggested that 
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Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 477 (2008).  
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restorative justice may be more meaningful for victims of crime than 
increased sentences for offenders.
47
  
Taking these ―intrinsic‖ motivations seriously suggests that the 
law may want to account for these intangible benefits that parties 
may wish to receive. For example, some states have already enacted 
laws to encourage apologies between litigants.
48
 Similarly, some have 
argued that the tremendous growth of alternative dispute resolution 
procedures has been fueled by those procedures‘ ability to provide 
individuals with more engagement with their own disputes, including 
greater opportunity to be heard and to engage with the opposing party 
and craft more collaborative solutions.
49
 Taking intrinsic motivation 
seriously in the context of the litigant may suggest that the law ought 
to make a greater effort to incorporate non-monetary aspects into its 
resolutions.  
CONCLUSION 
In his essay, Feldman has raised complex questions about 
compliance motivations. He has provided compelling research to 
support the idea that multiple motivations are in play in people‘s 
behavior with respect to the law and that the relationship between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is quite dynamic. In this Comment, 
I have suggested that, despite the importance of taking multiple 
compliance motivations seriously in order to understand why people 
follow the law, the intrinsic/extrinsic divide may be too simplistic. I 
have also argued that crowding out may indeed be a problem for our 
current legal system, but that raising penalties to a higher level would 
render moot concerns about crowding out for the affected population 
while not causing any decrease in compliance from other populations. 
Finally, I advocate considering multiple motivations from the ―other 
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side‖ of the law equation: while dominant paradigms have focused on 
the so-called extrinsic motivations of those seeking recovery from 
harm, a deeper consideration of multiple motivations can add nuance 
and accuracy to our understanding of litigant behavior.  
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